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Abstract
Virtually all theories of the evolution of cooperation require that cooperators find ways to interact with one another
selectively, to the exclusion of cheaters. This means that individuals must make reputational judgments about others as
cooperators, based on either direct or indirect evidence. Humans, and possibly other species, add another component to
the process: they know that they are being judged by others, and so they adjust their behavior in order to affect those
judgments – so-called impression management. Here, we show for the first time that already preschool children engage in
such behavior. In an experimental study, 5-year-old human children share more and steal less when they are being watched
by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same whether they are being watched by
a groupmate or not. This species difference suggests that humans’ concern for their own self-reputation, and their tendency
to manage the impression they are making on others, may be unique to humans among primates.
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Introduction
A key mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social groups
is reputation [1,2]. Thus, many animal species engage in so-called
partner choice, in which individuals known to be cooperative are
favored in various social activities, and those known to be non-
cooperative are shunned or avoided [3]. Being a good cooperator
thus pays, and being a poor cooperator costs.
Among primates, great apes have been shown to make
reputational judgments and partner choices of this kind. For
example, Melis, Hare, & Tomasello [4] gave individual chimpan-
zees a choice of partners for a mutualistic collaborative task. They
preferentially chose individuals whom they knew from direct
experience to be good collaborators over those whom they knew
from direct experience to be poor collaborators. Studies in which
great apes observe interactions (between humans) from a third-
party stance have yielded mixed results, but with at least some
evidence for reputational judgments resulting in a preference for
cooperators [5–7].
Humans of course make reputational judgments of coopera-
tiveness all the time, but, in addition, they know that they
themselves are often being judged, and so they have a concern for
what might be called self-reputation. Given this knowledge and
concern, humans often engage in what the sociologist Goffman [8]
calls impression management (or self-presentation), acting so as to
affect the reputational judgments of others toward the self. A
concern for self-reputation and active attempts at impression
management go beyond partner choice in which the individual
being favored or shunned by others may not know that this process
is going on and so make no attempts to control it. A number of
experimental studies have demonstrated that human adults know
when others are watching (indeed, they are even sensitive to
pictures of eyes on the wall; [9,10], and that they adjust their
behavior accordingly (e.g. [2,11,12].
Human infants make something like reputational judgments –
the process is typically called social evaluation – from as young as
6 months of age. Thus, Hamlin and colleagues [13] found that
young infants preferred to interact with a puppet who had helped,
rather than hindered, a third-party. But the age at which children
become concerned with self-reputation and engage in active acts of
impression management is not known. Virtually all studies of self-
reputation are interview studies with school-age children in which
participants have to linguistically formulate their concerns. For
example, Aloise-Young [14] asked 6-year old children to give
verbal self-descriptions to maximize their chances of subsequently
being picked as a partner in a game. Similarly, Banerjee, Bennett,
and Luke [15] asked children to verbally explain the self-
reputational consequences of various rule violations.
Using these methods, positive results have been reported only
for children 8 years of age or older. Banerjee [16] argues that the
problem is likely motivational; that is, while 5-year-old children
possess the necessary cognitive prerequisites for self-presentational
behavior, they lack a concern for being socially evaluated (which
emerges only during the primary school years). But it is also
possible that preschoolers simply do not possess the linguistic skills
and/or the self-awareness that would enable them to clearly
articulate their concerns for self-reputation and self-presentational
strategies. Supportive of this possibility, Piazza, Bering, and
Ingram [17] found that 6-year olds behave more prosocially in
the presence of an imaginary person than they do when they are in
an unobserved condition.
In a first study, therefore, we assessed 5-year-old children’s
concerns for self-reputation – with special reference to cooperative
behaviors – by observing them in two situations: helping and
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stealing. In some cases they were observed by a novel peer and in
other cases they were alone. If children this young are concerned
with their self-reputation for cooperation, we would expect them
to help more and steal less when being observed. Importantly, the
use of a novel peer observer instead of a familiar peer observer or
an adult observer enabled us to rule out explanations based on
familiarity, on the one hand, and authority and/or fear of
punishment, on the other. In addition, recipients were absent and
anonymous, so that any observed effects of condition could not be
interpreted as due to interpersonal relationships or concerns about
reciprocity [18]. We chose 5-year-olds as subjects as previous
research has shown that it is at this age that children first engage in
a central cognitive prerequisite of self-reputational behavior:
second-order mental reasoning [19,20] of the form ‘‘I am thinking
about what you are thinking about me’’ [16].
To provide an evolutionary perspective on our results, we
observed humans closest living relatives, chimpanzees, in a similar
set of experimental situations. Although chimpanzees have been
observed to produce food-associated calls differentially depending
on which conspecifics are nearby – so-called ‘‘audience effects’’
[21] – these are not concerned with a reputation for cooperation
and do not involve any impression management strategies. Based
on our personal experiences with chimpanzees, we had a clear
expectation that chimpanzees would not help more when being
observed than when alone. But given that chimpanzees do
sometimes engage in dominance displays, seemingly to impress
others with their power [22], we thought it might be possible that
they would steal more often when being observed, the opposite
effect from that expected from children.
Study 1: Children
Method
Ethics Statement. The presented study was non-invasive
and strictly adhered to the legal requirements of the country in
which it was conducted. The study was approved by the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Ethics Committee
(members of the committee are Prof. M. Tomasello, head of the
child lab Katharina Haberl, and research assistant Jana Jurkat).
The full procedure of the study was covered by the committee’s
approval. Informed written consent was obtained from all the
parents of the children who participated in this study.
Participants. We tested ninety-six 5-year-old children
(M=59 months 12 days; range = 57 months and 5 days to
62 months and 27 days). 24 subjects (12 girls, 12 boys) participat-
ed in each of the four conditions (helping observed/helping
unobserved; stealing observed/ stealing unobserved). Children
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. All subjects
were paired with same-sex observers (M=71 months 8 days;
range = 69 months 7 days to 74 months 26 days). Subjects and
observers attended the same day-care center but different groups
within the center.
Materials. Two identical sticker sheets (sheet 1 and sheet 2)
were positioned on a table at all times throughout the experiment.
Five symbols had been drawn on every sticker sheet: a star, a small
heart, a large heart, a smiley and a ladybird. During the
experiments, children were handed the appropriate stickers in
an envelope to conduct the respective tasks.
Procedure and Design. Each child participated in both
a warm-up phase as well as a test phase. The warm-up phase was
identical for all conditions. After the warm-up phase, each child
participated in one of the four conditions: stealing unobserved,
stealing observed, helping unobserved, or helping observed. In all
four conditions, subjects engaged in the same sticker game with the
aim of placing the appropriate stickers in all of the 5 predefined
symbols. Also in all conditions, sticker sheet 1, intended for the
subject, as well as sticker sheet 2, intended for another, anonymous
participant, were placed at 20 cm distance on the table. Each
participant underwent three trials in the respective condition.
Testing took place in a quiet room of the day-care center in a single
session.
Before the test phase, each subject engaged in a warm-up phase.
This phase was included in order to ensure that subjects had
understood the game. The warm-up game consisted of a smaller
version of the test phase sticker game. Subjects had to place 3
stickers on the appropriate symbols on a sticker sheet within
90 seconds. All 96 children were successful on the first attempt,
thus showing a strong understanding of the game.
For the stealing task, 5 copies of each of the 5 stickers were
placed on sticker sheet 2 prior to the experiment. Once subjects
had entered the room, they were told that sticker sheet 2 plus its
stickers were intended for another child who would play the game
later on. Then they received their own stickers from a separate
envelope. However, subjects received only 4 stickers in their
envelope. Thus, subjects were missing one sticker (star-shaped) to
complete the given task. Experimenter 1 then left the room. After
the child had placed all 4 stickers on her sticker sheet, the
experimenter waited for 40 seconds and then reentered the room
(Figure 1).
For the helping task, both sticker sheets were empty upon the
subject’s entrance. The experimenter then placed the sticker
contents from one envelope on sheet 2 and handed the stickers
from a second envelope to the child. The centrally located, star-
shaped sticker was absent from sheet 2. The child was then told
that if they got an additional sticker, they could either place it on
sheet 2 for the next participant or keep it for themselves (by
placing it on a small plate on the table as well). Order of the
presentation of these options was counterbalanced across trials
within subjects. After these instructions, Experimenter 1 left the
room. Once the child had made a choice, he reentered the room
(Figure 1).
For both of these tasks, subjects were alone in the testing room
in the unobserved conditions. In the observed conditions, an
observer was brought into the room prior to the start of the test
phase by Experimenter 2 and placed on a chair at 1.5 meters from
the subject. Observers were children from the same day-care
center but belonged to different groups than the subjects. Prior to
entering the testing room, observers were told by Experimenter 2
to closely watch the subjects. Experimenter 1 told subjects that
they would be in the room with another child. To eliminate
communication between observer and subject during the test
phase, observers listened to an audiobook while watching the
subject play (in addition, they were instructed not to engage in
conversation with each other).
Coding and dependent measure. All trials were videotaped
with 2 cameras and coded by the first author. A research assistant,
who was unaware of the study design and hypothesis, in-
dependently coded 25% of all trials. Number of stealing events
or helping events were coded. Interrater agreement was excellent
(k=1) in both tasks.
Results
Figure 2 shows the results of both the stealing task and helping
task. In the stealing task, subjects stole in 4% of all cases in the
observed and in 24% of all cases in the unobserved condition. A
Mann-Whitney U exact test found this difference to be statistically
reliable (U(24,24) = 223.5, p = .02, one-tailed). In the helping task,
subjects helped in 11% of all cases in the unobserved and in 28%
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of all cases in the observed condition. A Mann-Whitney U exact
test found a trend toward a significant difference (U(24,24) = 228,
p = .07, one-tailed).
Discussion
Experiment 1 found that children as young as 5 years of age
engage in self-reputational behavior. Thus, children stole less and
tended to help more in the observed compared to the unobserved
condition. The fact that the stealing result was statistically reliable
while the helping result was only a trend is likely due to the
different norms and rules involved in the two tasks. Specifically,
self-reputational behavior in the helping task would involve an
understanding of the social norm of helping someone in need. In
the stealing task, on the other hand, such behavior would involve
understanding the social rule that stealing is not allowed. It thus
seems plausible that young children are more aware of the
negative reputational consequences of breaking a salient social rule
as opposed to a rather complex social norm involving an
assessment of need.
Importantly, in our experimental design the observer was an
unfamiliar child and the recipient was absent, thus effectively
ruling out explanations based on the familiarity of either observer
or recipient and the fear of authority (in the case of an adult
observer).
Study 2: Chimpanzees
In order to explore the evolutionary foundations of this human
impression management behavior, we ran a similar study with
humans’ nearest primate relatives, chimpanzees.
Method
Ethics Statement. Research at the WKPRC was performed
in accordance with the recommendations of the Weatherall report
‘‘The use of non-human primates in research’’. Groups of apes
were housed in semi-natural indoor and outdoor enclosures with
regular feedings, daily enrichment and water ad lib. Subjects
voluntarily participated in the study and were never food or water
deprived. Research was conducted in the sleeping and/or
observation rooms. No medical, toxicological or neurobiological
research of any kind is conducted at the WKPRC. Research was
non-invasive and strictly adhered to the legal requirements of
Germany. The full procedure of the study was approved by the
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Ethics
Committee (members of the committee are Prof. M. Tomasello,
Dr. J. Call, Dr. D. Hanus, veterinarian Dr. A. Bernhard, head
keeper F. Schellhardt and assistant head keeper M. Lohse). Animal
husbandry and research comply with the ‘‘EAZA Minimum
Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos
and Aquaria’’, the ‘‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of
Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’’ and the ‘‘Guide-
lines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and
Teaching’’ of the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior
(ASAB). IRB approval was not necessary because no special
permission for the use of animals in purely behavioral or
observational studies is required in Germany. Further information
on this legislature can be found in paragraphs 7.1, 7.2 and 8.1 of
the German Protection of Animals Act (‘‘Tierschutzgesetz’’).
Figure. 1. Setup of the child study. Illustration of the experimental setup for children, viewed from the subject’s perspective. In the stealing task
(left) subjects could only finish their sticker sheet if they took a star-shaped sticker from sticker sheet 2, destined for an anonymous next participant.
In the helping task (right) subjects received one additional sticker. They had the option of either leaving the sticker for the next participant or taking it
home.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048433.g001
Figure. 2. Results of the child study.Mean percentage of responses
as a function of task and condition in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048433.g002
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Participants. Fourteen chimpanzees (9 females and 5 males),
ranging in age from 6 to 33 years (M=20 years), participated in
Study 2. A low-ranking female was chosen as recipient (age
= 9 years). A high-ranking male acted as observer (age
= 33 years). This was thought to generate increased reputational
concern, as chimpanzees’ fitness increases with strategic partner-
ships with dominant individuals (Silk, 2007). The recipient was
present in both conditions, observed and unobserved, but visually
hidden by occluders. The chimpanzees were socially housed at the
Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center in Leipzig, Germany.
Materials. For both the stealing and the helping tasks,
subjects had the possibility of pulling a rope from their room. The
rope was attached to a wooden platform, which could only be
accessed from the other, recipient’s, room (Figure 3). The platform
was in different positions for the two tasks. In the stealing task, the
platform initially was in a position such that the recipient could
easily access the food upon it. Pulling the rope moved the food to
a position where no one could reach it, whereas refraining from
pulling left the food available to the recipient. In the helping task,
the platform and food were initially out of the recipient’s reach.
Here, pulling the rope moved the food to within her reach,
whereas refraining from pulling left the food out of the recipient’s
reach. In both tasks, food was a mix of grapes, small pellets, and
raisins.
Procedure and Design. We employed a within-subjects
design across task and condition. Thus, subjects participated in
both tasks, helping and stealing, and both conditions, observed
and unobserved. Half of subjects started with the helping task, the
other half with the stealing task, and the order of conditions was
counterbalanced across subjects as well. Each session consisted of 4
blocked trials of the given condition. Before the test phase, each
chimpanzee was introduced to the apparatus to ensure an
understanding of its mechanisms. Testing took place in the
chimpanzees’ sleeping area.
In the stealing task, the introductory phase consisted of an
‘‘open door’’ and a ‘‘closed door’’ situation with three trials each.
In the open door situation, doors between the testing units were
open and subjects could move freely within the three rooms.
Because food was accessible only from the room away from the
rope, subjects had to inhibit pulling the rope (not steal) in order to
gain access to the food in the other room (and pulling the rope was
irreversible). Only when subjects had reached the criterion of
accessing the food 3 times in a row (within a maximum of 8 trials)
did they pass from the ‘‘open door’’ to the ‘‘closed door’’ situation.
Nine subjects passed the criterion within the first 4 trials; all
subjects passed the criterion within 8 trials.
In the ‘‘closed door’’ situation, the doors between the rooms
were closed, as they would be in the test situation. Thus, subjects
learnt that they did not have access to the food, independent of
their decision to pull the rope or not. Subjects were expected to
pull the rope in the ‘‘closed door’’ situation only infrequently, as it
led to no rewarding result. Indeed, in 3 trials only one subject
pulled the rope twice and two subjects once, thus showing an
understanding of the situation.
In the helping task, the introductory phase also consisted of an
‘‘open door’’ and a ‘‘closed door’’ situation of 3 trials each. In the
‘‘open door’’ situation subjects learned that if they pulled the rope
in one room the food could be accessed from the opposite room.
Subjects moved from the ‘‘open door’’ to the ‘‘closed door’’
condition only after they passed the criterion of accessing the food
3 times in a row within a maximum of 8 trials. Twelve subjects
passed the criterion within the first 4 trials, the remaining 2
subjects within 8 trials.
In the ‘‘closed door’’ situation, the doors between the rooms
were closed, as they would be in the test situation. Again, as in the
stealing condition, subjects learnt that they did not have access to
the food, independent of their decision to pull the rope or not. In
the ‘‘closed door’’ condition, pulling frequency declined over the
course of 3 trials.
The general procedure for testing was the same for both tasks.
On testing day, each subject first underwent a refresher that
consisted of one trial of both the ‘‘open door’’ and ‘‘closed door’’
situations. During testing, depending on condition, the observer
was either present or absent. Once all relevant apes were
positioned in their rooms, in both conditions of both tasks,
Experimenter 1 attracted the subject away from the apparatus
while Experimenter 2 placed food on the platform and extended
the rope into the subject’s room. Both experimenters then left the
area. After 60 seconds, Experimenter 1 returned to the room to
prepare for the next trial.
Coding and dependent measure. All trials were videotaped
with 4 cameras and coded by the first author. A research assistant,
unaware of the study design and hypothesis, independently coded
25% of all trials. Number of stealing events or helping events were
coded. Interrater agreement (k) was excellent at.9 (stealing) and 1
(helping).
Figure. 3. Setup of the chimpanzee study. Illustration of the experimental setup for chimpanzees, viewed from the experimenter’s point of view.
The observed condition (pictured here) consisted of three different roles, subject (left), observer (middle) and receiver (right). In the stealing task (left),
subjects could steal food from the receiver by collapsing the food platform. In the helping task (left), subjects could give food to the recipient, which
they couldn’t obtain otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048433.g003
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Results
As seen in figure 4, responses in the observed conditions were
very similar to responses in the unobserved conditions in both
tasks. Specifically, in the helping task, subjects helped in 34% of all
cases in the observed condition and 36% of all cases in the
unobserved condition (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z=2.272,
p = .47, one-tailed). In the stealing task, subjects stole in 20% of all
cases in the observed condition and in 23% of all cases in the
unobserved condition (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z=2.136,
p = .50, one-tailed).
Discussion
In this experiment chimpanzees showed no evidence of any self-
presentational (impression management) behaviors. Subjects
showed a constant helping and stealing rate, independent of
condition. One might argue that the chimpanzees did not fully
understand the apparatus, but the results from the introductory
phase of both tasks demonstrate that they did. One might also
worry that somehow subjects thought that the recipient was
observing them in the unobserved conditions (unlike the child
study where children could be told of a mythical other child, the
chimpanzees had to know of a real recipient). But we blocked their
view so they could not see each other (though they might hear
each other), and, moreover, the recipient was a subordinate
individual, whose reputational judgment should be less important.
Crucially, in the observed conditions an alpha-male was watching,
in full view of the subject, which should evoke a much greater
reputational concern in subjects capable of such concern.
General Discussion
In the current study, we found impression management (self-
presentational) behavior in 5-year-old children, the youngest age
found to date. This finding effectively falsifies the hypothesis
[14,16] that children this young, though cognitively capable, are
not concerned with the impression they are making on others. Our
findings were a bit stronger for the stealing task than for the
helping task, perhaps because a reputation as a thief is worse than
a reputation as a person who does not help when she could (or
who does help when she can). The fact that the dimension of
reputation at issue here was cooperation (as opposed to, for
instance, a reputation for competence) fits well with current
theories suggesting that, among primates, humans are especially
cooperative [23] and that cooperation is especially important in
human societies [24].
In contrast, the chimpanzees in our study did not behave
differently in either the helping or the stealing task when they were
being watched by a dominant conspecific. We had hypothesized
that the chimpanzees might have different reputational concerns
than the children, and so actually steal more often when being
watched to increase their reputation for dominant behavior. But
we did not observe this pattern of behavior either. It is of course
possible that we might find a concern for reputation in
chimpanzees in other situations, for example, ones in which they
would experience an immediate negative consequence of a nega-
tive judgment by others. But the fact that the observer was a high-
ranking male should have made the potential consequences, for
example, of stealing from another, relatively salient [25]. It is also
possible that chimpanzees would show a concern for a reputation
for being competent, or some other trait, as opposed to being
cooperative or non-cooperative.
Regarding the design of the two tasks, stealing and helping, two
differences to Study 1 were introduced in Study 2. One, during the
stealing task, chimpanzees could not obtain the stolen food. This
feature was introduced in Study 2 as it was expected that stealing
frequency would have been too high, i.e. at ceiling, if chimpanzee
subjects would have been given the possibility of stealing and
eating the food from a lower-ranking individual [26]. Two, during
the helping task, chimpanzees did not initially possess the food
which they could then give to a conspecific. This was introduced to
reduce the cost associated with the helping behavior and prevent
a possible ‘‘floor-effect’’ as a lot of research supports the argument
that chimpanzees do not engage in voluntary food sharing,
especially not with low-ranking individuals [26–28]. The relatively
low-cost nature of helping in Study 2 is also thought to explain the
fact that chimpanzees on average helped more than the children in
Study 1. This difference in design, however, cannot explain the
observed pattern of results.
The explanation for the observed species difference might be
either cognitive or motivational. Tomasello [29] argues that
a variety of evidence shows that chimpanzees cannot engage in the
kind of recursive mindreading (understanding that the other is
evaluating my intentional states) that would seem to be necessary
for strategic self-presentational behavior. Whereas chimpanzees
are capable of some theory of mind abilities, they seem to lack the
capacity for such meta-representations [30]. Children on the other
hand have routinely been shown to pass meta-representation tests,
such as false belief tests, from at least the age of five onwards [19].
This argument also fits nicely with recent results from social
neuroscience. Izuma and colleagues [31,32] have shown that the
same area that is involved in meta-representations, the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), also plays a crucial function in
reputation management.
The motivational possibility is that while chimpanzees for
example help both conspecifics and humans [33,34], the social
structure of chimpanzees is such that they know that the other is
evaluating them but they do not care. This is possible, but one
would certainly think that, especially in the case of stealing, a high-
ranking male should give lower ranking individuals pause – but
this still might be on the level of behavior and not reputation. So,
in all, although further evidence from other domains is needed,
our inclination is to support the hypothesis that both cognitive and
motivational factors are responsible.
Figure. 4. Results of the chimpanzee study. Mean percentage of
responses as a function of task and condition in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048433.g004
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A further interesting point relates to the conceptual relationship
between reputation management and punishment. Regarding
Study 1, one could argue that children’s behavior in the observed
stealing condition can be explained more plausibly by avoidance of
punishment. However, we believe that the use of a peer observer
(instead of an authority figure) makes that explanation relatively
unlikely. In addition, results from the helping task, showing
a tendency in 5-year olds to help more in an observed relative to
an unobserved condition, are not explicable by an avoidance of
punishment strategy. Furthermore, especially in development, an
avoidance of punishment strategy and an emerging sense of one’s
reputation might interact in interesting ways. A recent study by
Banerjee and colleagues [35] explicitly highlights the crucial role
of rule violations as key contexts for children’s learning about
public identity. We believe that the relationship between
punishment and reputation provides an interesting avenue for
future theoretical and empirical research.
Besides highlighting the crucial role of punishment [36,37],
current theories of the evolution of human cooperation stress the
role of social selection and partner choice [38,39]. Thus,
individuals who attempt to dominate non-cooperatively are subject
to coalitions of counter-dominance or reputation-killing gossip
[40,41]. In addition, when individuals depend on one another in
cooperative activities they must keep up their good reputation in
order to keep being chosen to participate [38], in which case
concern for self-reputation serves as a counterpoint to so-called
‘‘cheater detection’’. If others are choosing their partners and are
constantly vigilant to exclude cheaters, then I must appear to be
cooperative – and the best way to appear to be cooperative is to
actually be cooperative. In this regard, recent results showing that
the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus behaves more cooperatively in
the presence of an audience are especially interesting [42].
In terms of ontogeny, we of course do not believe that the
beginnings of a concern for self-reputation that we have observed
here are anything like the end of the story. Experiences in peer
groups during the elementary school years equip children with
a much deeper understanding of reputational mechanisms and
how they work. For example, it is probably not before school age
that gossiping becomes an integral part of reputation formation
[43,44]. And, of course, during adolescence a concern with self-
reputation and attempts at impression management reach their
apex, as being accepted by various groups and subgroups becomes
critical to social well-being. In any case, the current study
demonstrates that this relatively protracted developmental process
begins already during the preschool period.
When individuals are concerned about their self-reputation,
then, they are motivated to cooperate, especially when others are
observing, and observers can have this effect at very low cost to
themselves, that is, without the threat of direct punishment but
only the threat of a bad opinion.
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